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Summary
It is an age old principle that criminal responsibility requires a certain mental state,
generally of intent or knowledge, referred to as mens rea in this essay. Such an assessment
is not self-evident. For instance, could a perpetrator be held liable for massive loss of
life, even if it was not a primary intention? What is the role of recklessness? This essay
seeks to examine the case law and the lower limits of mens rea in regard to Crimes
against Humanity, which is an international crime striking at core values of humanity.
At the same time, it aims to critically investigate whether there has been any discernible
influence from liberalism in the provision.
This is made possible by critically outlining the history, author and case law of Crimes
against Humanity while at the same time consciously focusing on ideology where possible.
The analysis demonstrated that the prohibition of Crimes against Humanity stems from
a liberal idea, especially in regard to the author of the concept, but in the subsequent
case law liberalism has had a limited influence.
Concerning mens rea, the essay found that no coherent assessment has persisted
through the different tribunals. It varies in regard to everything from the importance
of discriminatory intent to the concept of constructive knowledge. The lower limit in the
case law varies with the assessment but the lowest have been that of recklessness. In
regard to the current provision on mens rea in the ICC statute this seems unlikely, with
oblique intent as more probable threshold.
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Sammanfattning
Straffra¨ttsligt ansvar har mycket la¨nge fo¨rutsatt upps˚at eller vetskap om den fo¨retagna
handlingen, s˚a kallad mens rea eller ”skyldigt sinnelag”. Hur en s˚adan bedo¨mning go¨rs
a¨r inte sja¨lvklart. Kan, till exempel, en missta¨nkt h˚allas ansvarig fo¨r handlingar som
resulterat i ma˚nga do¨dsfall, a¨ven om det inte var det prima¨ra syftet med handlingen?
Vilken roll spelar v˚ardslo¨shet? Den ha¨r uppsatsen syftar till att underso¨ka praxis och
mens reas undre gra¨ns i fo¨rh˚allande till brott mot ma¨nskligheten, ett internationellt brott
som angriper grundla¨ggande ma¨nskliga va¨rden. Samtidigt har uppsatsen till syfte att
kritiskt underso¨ka om det g˚ar att sko¨nja n˚agon liberal p˚averkan i artikeln som reglerar
brott mot ma¨nskligheten.
Detta go¨rs genom att kritiskt g˚a igenom praxis, historien samt fo¨rfattaren till artikeln
om brott mot ma¨nskligheten och samtidigt fokusera p˚a eventuella ideologiska aspekter na¨r
det a¨r mo¨jligt. Analysen har visat att fo¨rbudet mot brott mot ma¨nskligheten a¨r sprunget
ur en liberal ide´, sa¨rskilt i fo¨rh˚allande till artikelns fo¨rfattare. Dock har liberalismen haft
ett begra¨nsat inflytande p˚a dess efterfo¨ljande praxis.
Ang˚aende mens rea har uppsatsen kommit fram till att det i olika tribunaler inte
funnits n˚agot koherent sa¨tt att go¨ra bedo¨mningen. Det har varierat i allt fr˚an vikten
av diskriminerande upps˚at till mo¨jligheten att konstruera viss vetskap utifr˚an materiella
omsta¨ndigheter. Den nedre gra¨nsen fo¨r mens rea har ocks˚a fluktuerat men har la¨gst
manifesterats som v˚ardslo¨shet. Beaktas den nutida regleringen i Romstadgan fo¨refaller
dock v˚ardslo¨shet vara en osannolikt l˚ag tro¨skel, ista¨llet tyder allt p˚a att ”oblique intent”
a¨r den la¨gsta gra¨nsen fo¨r mens rea i ICC.
4
List of Abbreviations
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICC International Criminal Court
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ILC International Law Commission
IMT International Military Tribunal
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
PTC Pre-Trial Chamber
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
5
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The main inspiration for this essay has been MIT professor Noam Chomsky’s discussion
on the Clinton administration’s bombing of Al-Shifa, a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.
Human Rights Watch reported that the bombing led to a stop in relief work due to lack
of supplies, with deadly consequences for the 2.4 million of the civilian population on
the brink of starvation.1 Germany’s ambassador to Sudan of the time estimated the loss
of life to be in the tens of thousands.2 Chomsky claims no credible evidence exists for
the official stance of the administration, namely that the plant was harboring terrorists.
Instead he suggests it was hit as a retaliatory strike after the 1998 United States embassy
bombings.3 Whereas Chomsky has compared it to 9/11, others have objected that the
intent is crucial and that the US administration must have had some sort of humanitarian
mission.4 Some have pointed out different forms of intent between Clinton and the
hijackers while simultaneously acknowledging the loss of life in both atrocities.5
The assessment of intention is rarely obvious. Could we ascribe Clinton responsibility
even though it is claimed that death was not his primary objective? What is the role of
knowledge? Can you commit a Crime against Humanity by being reckless? This essay
hopes to address such criminal liability in the international order.
1.2 Purpose and limitations
The purpose of this essay is to explore the concept of criminal responsibility relating to
certain mental states, also known as mens rea, is handled in international criminal law,
especially in regard to its lower limit and ideology. To do this I have focused on the mens
rea of Crimes against Humanity. Still, international criminal law is filled with sprawling
case law with contours not yet consolidated, which means that establishing anything
firmly will be difficult.
According to the Argentine author Jorge Luis Borges, ”every writer creates his precur-
1Roth 1998.
2Daum 2001, p. 19.
3Chomsky 2011, p. 13.
4see for instance Chomsky’s email exchange with neuroscientist Sam Harris.
5Cowburn et al. 2015, p. 12.
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sors”.6 In a similar vein, the historical evolution of Crimes against Humanity are by some
jurists traced back to the fifth century B.C.7 Recounting the history in such a manner is
neither possible nor desirable within the scope of this essay. I will therefore only briefly
explore the historical origin and its ideological aspects in regard to Hersh Lauterpacht,
considered by prominent international lawyers to be the central figure in the history of
the term8 and take the Nuremberg trial as my departure point. Since the purpose of
outlining the history is to provide general principles of international law, I have steered
clear of cases brought under special domestic or military jurisdiction. Instead the focus
will be on the historical development of mens rea in order to determine its contemporary
application.
Throughout this essay, there is an intentional focus on ideology where applicable.
The author is convinced that international law is inherently political and indeed an arena
for political struggle. When comparing Crimes against Humanity to its legal cousin,
Genocide, the ideological differences are exceedingly clear. This view is by no means
peripheral in contemporary legal scholarship.9
1.3 Research Questions
This essay aims to answer the following questions:
1. How is mens rea assessed in Crimes against Humanity?
2. How has the provision been shaped in regard to liberalism?
3. How low is the mens rea threshold in Crimes against Humanity?
1.4 Method and theory
The first and third question and to some extent the second question will be analyzed
through a general international legal method. That is, I will interpret relevant treaties
and case law in line with the legal sources laid out in article 38(1) ICJ. It is generally
agreed that the first two sources, treaties and customary international law are not bound
6Borges 1964.
7Bassiouni 2011, p. 154.
8Sands 2016.
9Koskenniemi 1990, pp. 28-32.
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by a rigid hierarchy but exist alongside each other, accordingly they will be granted equal
importance.10 To find cases representative of the general legal currents of the tribunals
the legal scholarship of Badar and Bassiouni11 will be used.
In addition, the second question will depend on the historical background as it is not
answerable only through a general international legal method. To provide depth and
context to the provision I will make use of the intentional ideological focus mentioned
above.
Introducing the history behind every case would make it impossible outline some sort
of general legal tendency. Therefore, in order to discuss mens rea in a satisfying way
there will be little to no discussion about the material circumstances of the cases. This
is a common way of describing mens rea in the legal scholarship.12
1.5 Essay structure
The historical context of Crimes against Humanity is a prerequisite for understanding
its contemporary application. Therefore its roots and evolution will briefly explored in
regard to its ideological foundation, author and important tribunals. When reviewing
this, the mens rea analysis will be intertwined.
Continuing on, there will be an inquiry into the current legal status of Crimes against
Humanity as it exists within the ICC statute and customary international law. This will
lay the groundwork for reviewing contemporary mens rea. The essay concludes with an
analysis of the concepts discussed.
10Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, para 176.
11Featured extensively in this essay as well as chair of the drafting committee at the Rome Conference
that finalized article 7(2) of the ICC statute
12Badar 2013, among others.
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2 A Brief Introduction to the Concepts
2.1 Mens rea
Criminal responsibility and personal guilt are central to all criminal law and date far
back.13 Their imposition are generally handled by the concept of mens rea, which trans-
lates to ”guilty mind”14 and requires:
1. intention to commit a crime or;
2. knowledge that such action or inaction would cause the commission of the crime.15
In the context of international law, there is a provision in Article 30 in the ICC statute
concerning the mental element. It states that a person can only be criminally responsible
where the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. Intent in this
case signifies that the person means to engage in the conduct and means to cause, or is
aware, of a certain consequence that follows in the ordinary course of events.
Conceptually, the framework of intent is split into levels of culpability with dolus di-
rectus or direct intent being the highest, it means that the perpetrator desires or foresees
the illegality and/or harmful consequence of his or her act or omission. This is followed
by dolus indirectus or indirect intent in which certain secondary harmful consequences
were foreseen by the perpetrator as a certainty and even if these were not desired by the
perpetrator, he or she still committed the act. If, on the other hand, the perpetrator
foresees other consequences than those desired as a possibility and nevertheless follows
through with an act by reconciling her- or himself with it, dolus eventualis is at hand. Do-
lus eventualis is distinguished from dolus indirectus since in the former the consequences
were seen as a mere possibility, not a certainty as is the case in the latter.16
In the lower thresholds of mens rea the line becomes blurred as to dolus eventualis and
recklessness. Cassese treats them as very near concepts but differentiates them by stating
that a volitional element of acceptance or reconciliation is necessary in dolus eventualis17
and in recklessness mere knowledge of an unjustifiably high risk suffices.18
13Badar 2013, p. 4.
14Law and Martin 2009.
15mens rea is associated Actus Reus, the ”guilty act” or the external element of the crime.
16Van der Vyver 2004, pp. 63-64.
17see Section 5.1 Forms of Intent.
18Cassese 2009, p. 302.
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Negligence can sometimes form a basis for criminal liability but is not strictly a form of
mens rea because it refers to an objective standard rather than a state of mind. Therefore
it falls beyond the scope of this essay which treats recklessness as the lowest form of mens
rea. Furthermore, negligence can only form the basis for international criminal liability
in exceptional cases.19
Throughout this essay liberalism is used to denote a sort of juridical individualism
which treats all people alike, without ascribing them group identity. Therefore, it can
only somewhat account for the fact that humans exist in particular social contexts, with
different underlying social relations.20
2.2 Crimes against Humanity
Crimes against Humanity currently exist in four primary conventional formulations in
addition to its presence in customary international law. These are:
• Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter
• Article 5 of the ICTY statute
• Article 3 of the ICTR statute
• Article 7 of the ICC statute21
While they all differ slightly, as will be discussed in further detail below, their aim
and content is similar. The purpose of the prohibition of Crimes against Humanity
is to outlaw heinous acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, rape, torture,
imprisonment and so on.
19Cassese 2009, p. 57.
20Norrie 1990, p. 199.
21Bassiouni 2011, p. 361.
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3 Historical Background
3.1 The Contemporary Origin of Crimes against Humanity
To clarify the relationship between liberalism and Crimes against Humanity, the origin of
the provision will be discussed below in regard to its author and ideological father, Hersh
Lauterpacht. He was an international lawyer who denounced the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights as dangerous and useless due to its non-binding character and the
concessions that had been made in the name of state sovereignty.22 This illustrates how his
legal thinking cannot be separated from his political views as they are part of a coherent
liberal world view which favors the individual above group identity. He saw himself
as a naturalist in the tradition of Hugo Grotius to a certain extent, while at the same
time defining himself as liberal and progressive in the sense of a critical posture towards
statehood, sovereignty and nationalism. These doctrines were metaphysical and mystical
according to Lauterpacht, and strikingly contrary to the cosmopolitan and rationalist
liberalism he represented.23
The first use of the term Crimes against Humanity in positive international law was
authored by Lauterpacht in article 6(c) the Nuremberg Charter (also known as the London
Charter or IMT Charter).
”murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in vi-
olation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”
The article differs from the superficially similar concept of genocide in a few ways.
Lemkin, who originated the term genocide, put his focus lies with the group, he argued
that certain people were targeted because of their belonging to a specific group (i.e
ethnicity, religion and so on) and that the law must take into account a so called genocidal
intent. Lauterpacht never formally explained his skepticism toward focusing on group
identity, but it is a view consistent with the rest of his ideology, where the liberal focus
22Moyn 2010, p. 184.
23Koskenniemi 2001, pp. 356-359.
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lies with the individual rather than abstract, illusory entities. With the focus put on
individual victims and perpetrators he sought to diminish conflicts between groups and
feared that other models might exacerbate conflicts due to group identity.24
3.2 Nuremberg and Crimes against Humanity
Nuremberg is by most considered a significant step forward for international law, even
though there have been accusations of victor’s justice.25 It was significant by introducing
mens rea to international criminal law. Counterintuitive perhaps since the charter did
not include a general provision on the mental element.26 Thus, legal developments had to
happen on a case-by-case basis which hindered the coherent use of mens rea. The resulting
jurisprudence is vague and incoherent, not least in judges employing both common law
and continental law terms27. The prohibition against Crimes against Humanity had
on the other hand existed long before Article 6(c) in the Nuremberg Charter codified
it. It was seen as general principle of law and an outgrowth of both customary and
conventional international humanitarian law, see for instance the Preamble of the 1907
Hague Convention which refers to ”laws of humanity”.28
Crimes against Humanity are currently set apart from other international humanitar-
ian law by being applicable regardless of the the legal characterization of the conflict in
which they occur, i.e they can be committed in both international and non-international
contexts. It is, however, important to note that this is a development that took place
after the Nuremberg Charter. One reason for this was that Crimes against Humanity
were linked to War Crimes in article 6(b) to give them more legitimacy in the sense of
nullum crimen sine lege.29
The practical application of the provision was outlined by the general prosecutor for
the UK, Shawcross. He pointed out that the Crimes against German nationals or stateless
Jews, even if not illegal during Nazi rule were to be viewed as crimes against the ”Laws
of Nations” when committed with the intention of affecting the international community.
He went on to state that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the state and that the
24Sands 2016, pp. 290-300, 395.
25Bassiouni 2011, p. 163.
26Cassese 2009, p. 57.
27Badar 2013, pp. 1-2.
28Bassiouni 2011, pp. 109-111.
29Ibid., pp. 112-113.
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individual human being is the ultimate unit of all law.30 This is in line with both the
traditional view of Grotius and the individualist approach envisaged by Lauterpacht,
whose liberalism made itself known throughout the trial since he was authoring many
drafts for the prosecution.31 The liberal skepticism of absolute state sovereignty was
echoed by Justice Robert Jackson, US delegate to the Nuremberg Conference who stated
that ” [O]rdinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward its own
citizens warrant our interference [..] We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt
to bring retribution to individuals or to States only because the concentration camps and
the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of making an unjust
or illegal war in which we became involved”.32 This also makes reference to the state
policy element which will be discussed further below.
3.2.1 Cases of the IMT
Although parts of the jurisprudence appear inconsistent due to the recent arrival of
mens rea in the international context, there are recurring factors for inputting individual
criminal responsibility. One of them being ”knowledge”. As was the case in the Hans
Frank trial where the IMT ruled that Frank was a ”willing and knowing participant [...]
in a program involving the murder of at least three million Jews”.33 Also in the Streicher
trial the court ruled that his writing and publishing propaganda in the anti-Semitic
tabloid Der Stu¨rmer with knowledge of the ongoing extermination of Jews amounted to
persecution on racial and political grounds as a Crime against Humanity.34
In a similar vein, the defendant in the Schacht trial was acquitted since it could
not be established beyond reasonable doubt that he had the knowledge of Nazi plans.
The Court’s underpinning idea was that by co-operating with the knowledge of Nazi
plans the accused made themselves parties to that plan.35 How is knowledge determined?
One factor suggested by the jurisprudence is that a position of authority can entail an
assumption of knowledge. In the Do¨nitz case, his position as commander-in-chief made
the IMT rule that a man in his position ”must necessarily have known” about the use of
30Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors at the Close of the Case Against the Individual Defendants, 1946
31Koskenniemi 2001, p. 389.
32Bassiouni 2011, p. 20.
33Hans Frank Trial Judgment.
34Badar 2013, p. 240.
35Ibid., pp. 234-236.
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forced labor.36 In sum, knowledge was by all means sufficient for determining mens rea.
3.3 Post-Nuremberg developments
The attempts to codify the principles laid out in Nuremberg were long and arduous,
beginning in 1947 with the International Law Commissions (ILC) working on the ”Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind” and ending in 1996 with the
finalized draft, which was never adopted by the General Assembly.37 Still, it is instructive
of the general legal evolution of the provision in the sense that it went on to be applicable
both in war- and peacetime.
Mens rea was discussed throughout the drafting process of Crimes against Humanity.
Most viewed intent as a constituent element of a Crime against Humanity irrespective of
motive, although some viewed motive as useful in determining what acts were ”against
Humanity”. The Special Rapporteur concluded that what set Crimes against Humanity
apart from other crimes was that they struck at ”sacred” values, by being inspired by
racism, religious, ideological or political intolerance, i.e their motive.38 Thus, the 1991
Draft Code included Article 4 which made it impossible to invoke motive as an exculpa-
tory excuse if the motive is not covered by the definition of the crime.39
A few years prior members had raised questions as to whether Crimes against Hu-
manity in the Draft article should be confined solely to those based on ethnic, racial,
religious or political considerations. Emphasis was put on the fact that many groups of
individuals were driven by private gain, and that criminal acts committed by such groups
could amount to Crimes against Humanity even without group based focus.40
3.4 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was ap-
proved by the Security Council, as was the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR). Both statutes lack articles on mens rea, thus it has been largely up
36Badar 2013, p. 240.
37Bassiouni 2011, p. 171.
38ILC 1989, para. 151-156.
39ILC 1991, p. 99.
40ILC 1986, para. 91.
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to the sitting judges to determine the requisites for intent and knowledge.41 The two ad
hoc tribunals assigned different degrees of culpable mental states, the discussion below
will focus on direct intent and dolus eventualis.
3.4.1 Persecution as a Crime against Humanity
Mens rea in Crimes against Humanity appears prominently in the ICTY jurisprudence.
In the Kordic´ & Cˇerkez case (henceforth the Kordic´ case) examining the subcrime of
persecution, the Trial Chamber split mens rea in two. First examining whether the
accused had the particular intent to commit the underlying act, such as extermination,
murder, persecution and so on. Afterwards, for criminal liability, mens rea for Crimes
against Humanity is also required, namely knowledge of the context of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population.42 The Appeals Chamber follows the
same model by stating that the accused has the requisite intent to commit the underlying
offence(s) with which he is charged, when he knows that there is an attack on the civilian
population and also knows that his acts comprise part of that attack.43
The Chamber goes on to establish that persecution does not require a so called ”perse-
cutory intent”, that is intent behind a persecutory plan or state policy if the perpetrator
de facto is carrying out physical acts of persecution. Rather, what is required is specific
intent or dolus specialis to discriminate on political, racial or religious grounds, so called
discriminatory intent. Discriminatory intent is at hand when ”circumstances surrounding
the commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of such intent”.44 Subse-
quently, the Krnojelac judgment clarified that the accused needs to ”consciously intend
to discriminate”, therefore simple awareness of a possibly discriminatory behavior is not
enough.45 This markedly excludes dolus eventualis or recklessness.
It is important to note however, that not all Crimes against Humanity require discrim-
inatory intent, according to ICTY in the Tadic´ case, such an intent is an indispensable
legal ingredient of the offense only with regard to those crimes for which this is expressly
41Badar 2013, p. 287.
42Kordic´ & Cerkez Trial Judgment, para. 211-212.
43Kordic´ & Cerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 99. (also citing back to Blaskic´ Appeal Judgement, para.
124. and Tadic´ Appeal Judgment para. 248.).
44Kordic´ & Cerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 110-111.
45Kronjelac Trial Judgment, para. 435.
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required, that is, for Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution.46
3.4.2 Ordering subcrimes
Ordering a Crime against Humanity will make the person ordering criminally responsible
according to Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute. The Appeals Chamber concluded in the
Blasic´ case that someone who orders, instigates or plans a certain act or omission with the
awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed has the requisite
mens rea for establishing liability as a crime against humanity pursuant to ordering,
instigating or planning.47 The key issue then, is how determine if an order has been
made.
In the Kordic´ case this was done to a large extent by examining evidence of Kordic´’s
political inclinations and stances, noting for instance his strong nationalism, importance
given to ethnicity and desire to attain the sovereign Croatian state. From this the court
concludes that he possessed the specific intent to discriminate required for it to be a
Crime against Humanity.48 This is similar to the IMT’s inference of knowledge in the
Streicher case above.
3.4.3 Dolus eventualis, Recklessness and the Crime of Extermination
Extermination is a subcrime for which the requisite intent was established in the Blagovic´
and Jokic´ case as: to kill persons on a massive scale, or to inflict serious bodily harm or
create conditions of life that lead to the the death in the reasonable knowledge that such an
act or omission is likely to cause the death of a large number of people.49 Within the ICTY
jurisprudence three different mens rea requirements can be identified.50 In the Krstic´ case,
the requirement is put as low as recklessness, based on that the perpetrator ”must have
reasonably foreseen such was likely to result in death”51 This is disputed by the Stakic´
case where extermination has dolus eventualis as its lowest requirement. Recklessness,
the Trial Chamber argues, would neither be compatible with the character of the crimes
46Tadic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 305.
47Blaskic´ Appeal Judgement, para. 166.
48Kordic´ & Cerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 722.
49Blagovic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment, para. 572.
50Badar 2013, p. 307.
51Krstic´ Trial Judgment, para. 495.
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of extermination not the system of and construction of article 5.52 Accordingly, the lowest
threshold would consist of a situation where the accused has acted with knowledge that
mass death is a likely outcome and reconciled him- or herself with it. Dolus eventualis is
further differentiated from recklessness by a volitional element which can be read about
below.
3.5 International Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Rwandan context mens rea in Crimes against Humanity were discussed in the
Munyakazi Appeal Judgment. The accused claims that no legal basis for establish intent
in regard to extermination. The court holds that his intent to kill persons on a massive
scale or subject them to conditions that would lead to their death in a widespread and
systemic manner is clear from taking a leadership role in the murdering of thousands of
Tutsi civilians, and doing this on ethnic grounds.53 Focus here is on the participation
rather than the political inclinations or views of the accused (as in the Kordic´ case), for
which the evidence was rather scant.
It is noteworthy that this statute differs from the ICTY statute by putting ”national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” as a prerequisite for all subcrimes, not only
persecution. Thus, there is greater emphasis on discriminatory intent.
Intent is further discussed in the Akayesu case, where the differences between ICTY
and ICTR are made clear. The Appeals Chamber points out that Article 5 ICTY does
not contain the same requisite in its chapeau54 that the crime be ”committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds”. Still, the chamber holds that this does not automat-
ically allow for an e contrario reading of what is contained in the Tadic´ case (discussed
above), namely that all Crimes against Humanity contained in the ICTR must have
discriminatory intent.55
The ICTR and ICTY are consistent in their inconsistent mens rea prerequisites for
extermination. In the Munyakazi Judgment discussed above, the Appeals Chamber pre-
sumes a very high threshold, stressing the link to specific intent or dolus specialis of
52Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 642.
53Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 141-143.
54Introductory text broadly defining principles, objectives, and background of the treaty or statute.
55Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para. 462.
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genocide several times, which must then for Crimes against Humanity be seen as direct
intent.56 In the Kayishema case the Trial Chamber mentions recklessness and direct in-
tent as requirements but strangely not dolus eventualis. What’s more is that to be the
basis for criminal liability, said recklessness must be accompanied by an awareness that it
forms part of a widespead or systematic attack against civilians on at least one of the dis-
criminatory ground laid out in ICTR, in other words: discriminatory recklessness.57 The
Kamuhanda Trial Chamber interpreted Kayishema as not necessarily lowering the mens
rea requisite but rather suggesting that reckless conduct is indicative of the offender’s
mens rea.58
56Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 141-145.
57Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 141.
58Kamuhanda Trial Judgment, para. 695.
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4 Crimes against Humanity revisited
4.1 Current legal status
Apart from the Nuremberg charter or the statutes of the special tribunals the contempo-
rary provision of Crimes against Humanity is Article 7 of the statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC).
According to Article 7(2) of the ICC statute, Crimes against Humanity can only be
committed ”pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy”. Many
academics view this provision as encompassing many non-state actors.59 Bassiouni does
not share this view. The customary international law counterpart to Article 7 ICC
goes even further putting no prerequisite whatsoever of the existence of an underlying
State plan or policy. This draws from the Kunarac case in which the Appeals Chamber
motivates its exclusion of a state policy element by referring to the Nuremberg Charter
in which none exist, as well as some national cases.60 This is of course true, but arguably
does not necessarily entail the exclusion of a state policy requirement as the Nuremberg
charter intrinsically had the Nazi regime and their state policy as its area of use.61
As a consequence of this element, the finding of mens rea must take knowledge of such
an organizational policy into consideration.
4.1.1 Customary International law
A binding customary rule is indicated by state praxis and opinio juris. As stated above,
the historical origin in positive law can be traced back to the Nuremberg Charter, while
the custom arose earlier around 1919.62 The existence of a customary international legal
prohibition against Crimes against Humanity is an uncontroversial issue in contemporary
legal scholarship, not least since the articles on Crimes against Humanity in the major
statutes were adopted to reflect international customary law.63 It should be noted how-
ever, that this does make the customary counterpart of the statues exactly the same,
especially with reference to the subcrimes.64 More than fifty countries have currently
59Schabas 2008, p. 347.
60Ibid., p. 348.
61Ibid., p. 349.
62Bassiouni 2011, p. 147.
63Ibid., pp. 25, 202, 342.
64Ibid., p. 350.
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implemented a national criminalization of Crimes agaist Humanity with varying content
and scope. These must be considered ”general principles of law” to a certain extent.65
Even if the material content is not entirely clear, such universal condemnation will in
time result in jus cogens status.66
What can then be said about the mens rea of customary international law? The
question is raised in the Tadic´ case where conventional law does not adequately answer
criminal responsibility in the circumstance of collective criminality, so called joint criminal
enterprise. By citing extensive case law beginning with the Nuremberg Charter, they
conclude that the courts applied dolus eventualis or even culpa (albeit a high degree) in
some cases.67 According to Bassiouni, this jurisprudence is selective and runs the risk of
deteriorating the principles of culpability.68 Because there has not been many cases where
the prosecution has had to rely on customary law, the mens rea requirement in cases not
of joint criminal enterprise remains unclear. In cases where a plan of criminality is not as
flagrant as in a joint criminal enterprise, the mens rea thresholds would likely be higher
than these remarkably low ones. It is notable that they would not satisfy the requirement
of Article 30 ICC, further discussed below.
65Bassiouni 2011, p. 202.
66Ibid., p. 463.
67Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 187-220.
68Bassiouni 2011, p. 562.
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5 Contemporary mens rea
5.1 Forms of Intent
In its most recent embodiment of the ICC statute, there is little case law to help deter-
mine the mens rea requirement for Crimes against Humanity. But, as mentioned in the
introduction there is a mens rea provision in Article 30 of the ICC statute. It has been
limited to intent and knowledge, leaving out other possible mens rea requirements such
as recklessness or dolus eventualis. This is not to say that these other forms do not exist,
because they do, it is rather to say that they are not sufficient for criminal liability as a
general rule.69 The existence of dolus eventualis was asserted by the ICC Pre-Trial Cham-
ber (PTC) in the Lubanga Case, as being encompassed within the so called requirement
of a volitional element. This element refers to situations when the accused:
1. knows that his acts or omissions will materialize the material element of the crime
at issue;
2. and undertakes these acts or omissions with the concrete intention of bringing about
the material elements of the crime.70
According to the PTC, dolus eventualis (simplified it means awareness of a likely
outcome of an action) is at hand in situations where the suspect is:
1. aware of the risk that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or
her actions or omissions;
2. and accepts such an outcome by reconciling her- or himself with it or consenting to
it.71
This means that if a person’s mental state does not accept that the objective elements
of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, such a state of mind would
not meet the ”intent and knowledge” requirement of article 30 ICC. Thus, the PTC are
following in the civil law tradition of dolus eventualis, rather than the ”recklessness” of
common law as the latter would not meet the lowest possible threshold of Article 30, as
69Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones 2002, p. 850.
70Badar 2013, p. 391.
71Ibid., p. 395.
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recklessness does not necessarily require the suspect to reconcile her- or himself with the
result.72 It should be noted that the Lubanga case concerns War Crimes and not Crimes
against Humanity, still, the technicalities of article 30 are essential to the mens rea of
Crimes against Humanity.
Prior to the Lubanga case, some73 had argued for including recklessness as a lower
mens rea threshold in Article 30 since someone taking a high and unjustifiable risk when
for instance shelling a town should be able to be held accountable. It is questionable
however, if the same applies to Crimes against Humanity due to the extreme gravity of
the offence. Especially when even the the inclusion of dolus eventualis is controversial.74
Subsequently, the Bemba Decision on the Confirmation of Charges declared that ar-
ticle 30 does not accommodate for a lower threshold of intent than dolus directus in the
second degree or the so called ”oblique intent” of the common law tradition. The lowest
form of intent accommodated for would then be when the objective criminal elements
are foreseen by the suspect as a consequence, although not as the primary objective,
the suspect follows through with the act regardless. Teleologically, the chamber argued
that the Article 30(2)b text ”aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”
would have been replaced by may occur had the drafters wished for the inclusion of dolus
eventualis. It should be noted, however, that there is at best a very weak consensus on
this issue in the legal scholarship.75
5.2 The Element of Knowledge
Knowledge is an integral part of imposing criminal liability. 76 The ICTY cases, especially
in their trial chamber renderings used ”constructive knowledge” as a central concept.77
The term is vague but Van der Vyver suggests it can be used as denoting cases where
direct evidence can not be found to provide insight into the knowledge of the suspect
and knowledge may then instead by construed on the basis of surrounding facts and
circumstances.78 This method of implying knowledge from circumstances was confirmed
72Badar 2013, pp. 395-396.
73Cassese n.d., p. 154.
74Van der Vyver 2004, p. 68.
75Badar 2013, p. 398.
76See for instance subsection 3.2, 3.2.1
77Tadic´ Trial Judgement, para. 657.
78Van der Vyver 2004, p. 68.
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in the Tadic´ case.79
The importance of the assessment of knowledge cannot be stressed enough since it
is not only used in the manner discussed above, but also part of the imposing of dolus
eventualis as it is necessary for a suspect to possess knowledge of a risk to reconcile
themselves with it. It is however, important to differentiate knowledge from negligence.
In the Blasic´ case, a superior could be be held responsible for deliberately refraining to
find out but not for failing to find out due to negligence, a sort of willful blindness.80
The above may arguably stand as customary international law but constructive knowl-
edge and likely the willful blindness of the Blasic´ case are excluded from Crimes against
Humanity as it appears in the ICC Statute. This is because Article 30(3) makes use of the
terms awareness that a circumstance exists which must be interpreted as only referring
to actual knowledge. Actual knowledge by definition excludes constructive knowledge.81
5.3 Motive or mens rea?
In the Blasic´ case the Appeals Chamber distinguishes mens rea from motive by stat-
ing that the former is the mental state of the accused at a certain time, while motive
is generally what causes them to act. The motive is of importance in crimes that re-
quire specific intent, such as genocide, but as a general rule motive is irrelevant.82 The
distinction, however, need not be obvious, what then about the discriminatory intent
outlined above? Discriminatory intent requires motive, in the sense of specific intent, but
not towards an individual as such but because of that individuals belonging to a certain
group or community.83 This does not mean, however, that the mens rea requirements
are the same for genocide and persecution as a Crime against Humanity. Genocide is
to be viewed as more extreme form of persecution where the intent is to destroy, while
persecution can take on many forms.84
79Tadic´ Trial Judgment, para. 657.
80Blaskic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 407
81Badar 2013, p. 399.
82Blasic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 694.
83Bassiouni 2011, p. 400.
84Kupresˇkic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 176
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5.4 Criticism of the concept
In Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of Crim-
inal Justice, Norrie claims that criminal responsibility is an exceptional area in that it
embodies rules which adequately protect individuals from unlawful intervention and pun-
ishment. Thus, any departures from the defense of the individual in favor of social utility
must be departures from the logic of the law itself. Legal reasoning then becomes a cover
for policy objectives, sliding from rationality toward rationalization.85 The criticism is
based on that the law does not account enough for the fundamental social and historical
contradictions at the heart of the society.86
85Norrie 1990, p. 185.
86Ibid., p. 188.
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6 Analysis
6.1 Liberalism
The initial idea behind this essay was to examine whether any liberal tendencies could
be discerned in the prohibition against Crimes against Humanity or if there was a whole
structural bias in regard to discriminatory intent, as the author of the original provision
held liberalism close to heart. However, I immediately ran into problems. Should the
ICTR statute be regarded as less liberal for having ”national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds” as a prerequisite for all subcrimes instead of just persecution as
Lauterpacht intended? In line with the liberal view, the answer would be yes.
Although I personally am of the opinion that liberalism is an inadequate ideology to
handle discrimination due to its lack of understanding for structural bias and its aversion
to group identity, I have not found that more focus on group identity in the punishment
of perpetrators to be necessary in all cases, even if the practical application of Crimes
against Humanity to a large extent is group conflict. This does not mean group blindness
is unproblematic, merely that it has not manifested itself in the case law discussed above.
I think it is clear, however, that liberalism had a positive impact insofar as it criticized
notions of state sovereignty, thereby facilitating prosecution.
Still, if the discriminatory grounds de facto become requirements of group identity,
as their tendency points to in ICTR their purpose is questionable. It would be more
reasonable to exclude them from all but persecution, and let genocide handle the ma-
jor atrocities while maintaining discriminatory intent as an aggravating factor for other
Crimes against Humanity. This would widen the scope of the article in a meaningful way
while teleologically being in line with what Lauterpacht envisioned.
Norrie’s criticism was formulated in regard to national law but is somewhat relevant in
this context since it provides a theory as to why the mens rea assessments are incoherently
shaped. Namely because judges are forced to disregard individual rights in favor of social
utility. While I do think this is part of the underlying problem, much more of the
responsibility is borne by the lack of articles regulating mens rea accompanied by the
fact that this is a rather young legal area than rather than liberalism.
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6.2 Al-Shifa
This subsection aims to analyze the first and third research question by exemplifying
with the Al-Shifa bombing mentioned in the beginning. No coherent mens rea thresh-
old has persisted through the different embodiments of Crimes against Humanity and
their subcrimes. As a general tendency, there is more emphasis on and understanding of
the mental element in recent courts. The manner in the IMT imposed criminal liability
shows that intent was problematic to deal with in an international context putting focus
instead on knowledge, sometimes transcending into something similar to the ”construc-
tive knowledge” of Tadic´ by presuming that a position of authority entails knowledge.
While it may seem dubious in regard to rule of law to construe the mental disposition
of a perpetrator from secondary evidence, it can be a necessary manner of determining
mens rea, especially in cases where real intentions are hidden behind rhetoric such as ”hu-
manitarian intervention” and ”responsibility to protect” and the loss of life is perhaps
more the result of disregard for disenfranchised people than for instance ethnic tensions.
This, however, presupposes that the facts and circumstances are clear beyond reasonable
doubt.
Whether constructive knowledge would prove a fruitful path for a hypothetical pros-
ecution of the Al-Shifa bombing depends on if relying on customary or conventional law.
Article 30(3) prevents use of constructive knowledge in conjunction with the ICC statute
whereas case law and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations cited in this essay support a customary presence. Similarly to Tadic´, Clinton’s
knowledge could likely be inferred from the circumstances if relying on customary inter-
national law.
What then about the mens rea threshold? The argument made for the inclusion of
recklessness made prior to the Lubanga case87 could in some exceptional cases be applied
to a state policy or plan, that pursue policies running an unjustifiably high risk of resulting
in a Crime against Humanity. This presupposes that the subcrime in question does not
require specific intent. As mentioned above however, there is little support for this idea
in legal scholarship.
Case law from the ICTY and ICTR suggest that dolus eventualis would be the lowest
mens rea threshold for Crimes against Humanity. If this is the case, Clinton’s knowledge
87See subsection 5.1.
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could be construed to encompass the relevant risks of loss of life, which is intelligence likely
possessed by a head of state, which would make it possible to ascribe Clinton criminal
responsibility if he has reconciled himself with the result. Even if the threshold was set
to oblique intent as in the ICC, the massive loss of life would be a natural consequence
likely foreseen by Clinton and therefore incurring Criminal responsibility in regard to the
mens rea requirement.
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7 Conclusions
1. There has been no coherent way of determining mens rea throughout the different
tribunals. The assessment in the IMT puts extensive focus on knowledge and tends
to construe it from circumstances and facts. ICTY has a twofold mens rea test for
persecution, split into intent of the underlying act and specific intent. In the case of
ordering, the ICTY relied on circumstantial evidence such as political inclinations.
ICTY’s manner of determining the mens rea of extermination is vague but has
gradually increased focus on knowledge and reconciliation.
The ICTR is more focused on participation than circumstance. Extra emphasis
is put on discriminatory intent which in the case of extermination couples a high
degree of intent together with recklessness. Although this has been disputed by
later cases. ICC’s focus after the Bemba decision is on the suspects awareness that
something will occur in the ordinary course of events.
2. Liberalism has shaped the provision while having had a limited impact on its legal
development afterwards. It can neither be said to have been categorically positive
nor negative.
3. The ICTY is the first tribunal with clearly stated mens rea thresholds. For per-
secution the discrimination requires specific intent. For ordering everything points
toward direct intent. Extermination is likely characterized by dolus eventualis as
its lowest threshold.
ICTR may accommodate for a threshold as low as recklessness for the underlying
act but this need always be accompanied by a specific intent to discriminate.
The consensus on the lowest threshold of the ICC mens rea is weak. The Bemba
decision points toward oblique intent as the lowest form.
As for customary international law, the lowest form remains unclear. Tadic´ points
to remarkably low thresholds in the case of joint criminal enterprise. From the case
law cited in this essay, dolus eventualis seems like a more reasonable lower limit
because it appears frequently in the jurisprudence of many courts as well as legal
scholarship.
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